饭局狼人杀

一 |     　　讯 生态环境部、自然资源部等部门日前联合印发《生态保护“十五五”规划》，推进山水林田湖草沙一体化保护和系统治理，构建从山顶到海洋的保护治理大格局。

二 |     

    Illustration: Liu Rui/GTA new report funded by Australia's Department of Defense played up security risks to submarine cables in the Indo-Pacific waters and pointed finger at China and some other countries over alleged undersea‑cable attacks in recent years, while claiming threats against subsea cables are growing. A Chinese expert said that accusing China without conclusive evidence constitutes "over‑securitization" made by Australian side, as well as a calculated pretext for its own military expansion.
Published by the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), the paper claimed recent damage to cables in the Baltic Sea and around China's Taiwan region suggests "state actors are now actively probing and testing cable infrastructure in peacetime as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies" to rapidly degrade connectivity at the outset of a conflict, The Australian reported.
The paper claimed 16 privately owned subsea cables that carry 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic are a "high priority target" for Australia's adversaries that could be severed in a conflict, threatening the nation's economy and social fabric, according to The Australian.
The report singled out China and Russia for blame, saying that there have been multiple apparent attacks on submarine cables in recent years in European waters as well as near China's Taiwan region, suspected to be linked to Russia and China, the Straits Times reported.
However, the report cites a 2025 voyage by Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao along Australia's western and southern coastlines as evidence to back its claim that "potential adversaries are actively gathering information about Australia's cable infrastructure."
This report, relying on the routine scientific operations of a Chinese research vessel in 2025 to level allegations of offensive actions against China, and employing ambiguous terminology such as "suspected" and "potential," demonstrates Australia's evidentiary leap, Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday.
This erroneous claim was refuted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on March 31, 2025 that China carries out normal activities at sea in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. 
"We hope Australia will have a right understanding of this and stop the groundless suspicion and speculations," Guo added.
This is not the first time certain Australian politicians has leveled baseless accusations of China intending to sabotage its undersea cables. Back in May, Defense Minister Richard Marles claimed during the Shangri-La Dialogue that China ought to boost transparency around its maritime operations. He also asserted that a surge in damage to subsea cables had transformed the seabed into a "battlefield," per The Australian.
Chen said Australian side's scaremongering is tied to its predictive threat‑perception framework forged in recent years. This framework designates China and other countries as strategic competitors in advance, subsequently forces routine scientific activities into a confrontational framework, Chen said.
Apart from unfounded allegations against China, the paper claims Australia's defense military "must incorporate the defense of submarine cable infrastructure into its operational planning," according to The Australian.
It added the government should also consider up¬grading an auxiliary ship operated by the navy, ADV Guidance, to enable it to repair damaged cables.
The vast majority of submarine cable damages are caused by accidental factors such as fishing operations and vessel anchoring, rather than deliberate sabotage. For suspected cases of intentional damage, independent technical investigation bodies should be established, and the principle of "investigate first, characterize later" should be strictly applied, so as to prevent ordinary maritime accidents from escalating into diplomatic conflicts, Chen said.
The core problem of Australian side's submarine cable security lies entirely with itself. Instead of addressing its own infrastructure shortcomings and improving its domestic protection and maintenance systems, the Australian side has chosen to continually exaggerate external threats and stoke bloc confrontation, the expert added.
Chen said that by fabricating alleged Chinese threats, Australian side seeks to "rationalize" its military spending increases and underwater force expansion. The submarine digital infrastructure originally meant to serve global development has been labeled along us versus them lines, and this constitutes the biggest hidden danger, he added.
。　　规划提出，到2030年，生态空间格局持续优化，生态质量稳步改善，生物多样性丧失趋势得到有效缓解，优质生态产品供给更加丰富，生态系统多样性稳定性持续性不断提升，生态保护与修复监管制度进一步完善，国家生态安全得到有效保障。规划明确“十五五”时期的多项具体目标：包括自然保护地陆域面积占陆域国土面积比例不低于18%，生态质量指数（EQI）提升到86.5，水土保持率达到74%以上，森林覆盖率达到25.8%。

三 | 持续优化生态空间格局。持续巩固以“三区四带”为骨架的国家生态安全屏障体系，构筑“三北”工程区绿色屏障。

四 | 建立健全国土空间规划动态维护机制，优化生态保护红线范围。全面推进以国家公园为主体、自然保护区为基础、各类自然公园为补充的自然保护地体系建设。统筹考虑区域生态结构完整性、生态功能重要性，优化生态保护与修复监管重点区域，并根据生态状况调查评估结果、人为活动影响情况等动态调整。　　规划部署了推行自然生态系统休养生息，推进生态系统修复和提升城乡生态宜居品质三方面任务。规划对草原、森林、河湖、湿地等保护作出规定，并提出加强原生荒漠保护，推进冰川雪山冻土系统保护，加强典型海洋生态系统保护，严格管控围填海等。

五 | 同时，规划要求完善城市绿地系统，推动公园绿地开放共享，加强城市湿地生态和水环境修复，加强农村小微水体水环境治理，保护乡村山体田园、河湖湿地原生风貌，深入实施乡村绿化美化，优先采用乡土树种。全面加强生物多样性保护。加强野生物种、遗传资源保护与可持续利用。将生物多样性保护纳入城市相关法规、规划和政策制度体系。加强生物安全风险监测预警，持续推进外来入侵物种、生物技术应用、疫源疫病等领域风险识别、研判预警、应急处置。强化外来入侵物种监测管控，严格外来物种引入和生物技术产品环境释放审批。

六 | 强化生态质量监测评估、严格生态保护监督执法、健全生态保护保障体系、深入推进生态文明示范建设等任务。版权申明：凡注有“”或电头为“”的稿件，均为独家版权所有，未经许可不得转载或镜像；授权转载必须注明来源为“”，并保留“”的电头。    。